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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS
JANETTE DEEBEN

)
Plaintiff-Appellant

j -

) Case No. 880104-CA

vs.

) Priority 14b

DERICK R. DEEBEN

) j,
Defendant-Respondent )

BRIEF OF RESPONDENT
STATEMENT OF JURISDICTION AND THE NATURE
OF PROCEEDINGS BELOW.
Jurisdiction for the Court of Appeals to hear this
case

is governed by Section 78-2a-3(2)(g), Utah Code, as

amended.
over

The Court of Appeals has appellate jurisdiction

appeals

relations
annulment,

from

cases

the

district

including,

property

but

division,

court
not

child

involving

limited
custody,

to,

domestic
divorce,

support

and

visitation, adoption and paternity.
By original order on November 13, 1987, the Second
Judicial District Court for Davis County, Utah, granted an
Order of divorce to the parties herein, including a joint
custody

order for two minor children, with the defendant

having primary custody of the minor child, Heather Deeben,
and the plaintiff having primary custody of the minor child,
Kevin Deeben.
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Findings

of

Fact

and

Conclusions

of

Law

were

entered.
On December 31, 1987, the plaintiff made application
to the trial court for a stay of Judgment, and upon hearing,
January 19, 1988, the Courtfs order was entered that the
primary custody of Heather should remain with the defendant
and that the primary custody of Kevin should remain with the
plaintiff.
It was further ordered that the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law be amended by the inclusion of a complete
transcript of the Courts bench ruling of November 13, 1987.
Judgment and Decree of Divorce was then entered on
January 20, 1988.

On February 5, 1988, the plaintiff filed

a Notice of Appeal in the District Court.
Upon Plaintifffs motion in the Court of Appeals, the
case was remanded to the District Court with directions to
amend

the

Findings

of

Fact

to

reflect

the

Courtfs

determination of the "best interests of the child" under
standards articulated
judgment

if

in case

necessary.

The

law and
Court

to further

of Appeals

enter

retained

jurisdiction for further consideration on the merits of the
appeal.
On November 2, 1988, the trial court entered Amended
Findings of Fact and made additional findings, but did not
change its Judgment.

It directed the Court Clerk to return
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the file to the Court of Appeals, and this was done on
November 18, 1988.
The

Court

of

Appeals

then

directed

that

the

Appellant's brief be served and filed on or before December
18, 1988.

The brief was submitted on the 16th day of

December and the Respondent's brief is due January 15, 1988.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED FOR REVIEW
The defendant/respondent

chooses to make his own

statement of the issues as follows:
1.

The trial Court was not bound to accept as its

own the Conclusions of a home Study and Custody evaluation
made by order of the Court in not crediting the testimony of
witnesses whom the trial Court was free to credit, regarding
the

plaintiff's

past

behavior

and

the

effect

on

the

children.
2.

The

trial

Court

has

an

independent

responsibility to assure itself of the suitability of the
parent to whom a child is primarily attached.

Relative

weight of various factors in a particular case to determine
custody lies within the discretion of the trial court.
3.

Title 30-3-10, Utah Code, as amended, states the

proper basis for decision in the first instance of a custody
determination.
4.

The record does not support the plaintiff's

claim that the trial court's determination of custody was
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motivated by a desire to punish the plaintiff rather than by
its' concern for the child's best interests.
5.

The

authority

to

exercise

the

judicial

discretion under the circumstances revealed by the finding
is conferred upon the trial court.

Nothing short of a clear

abuse

interference

of discretion

can warrant

with

that

Court's order.
STATUTES WHOSE INTERPRETATION IS DETERMINATIVE.
30-3-10, Utah Code, as amended.

Custody of children

in case of separation or divorce - custody consideration (as
set forth in the Addendum below).

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
This is a divorce proceeding; trial was had before
the Honorable Douglas L. Cornaby
District Court for Davis County.

in the Second Judicial
The Decree of Divorce was

entered on January 20, 1988, and not changed on November 2,
1988, after remand by the Court of Appeals.

Additional

Findings

2,

of

Fact

Plaintiff/Appellant

were

made

on

November

1988.

appeals the custody award of Heather

Deeben, a minor child, to the defendant/respondent.
The Course of Proceedings
Plaintiff filed a Complaint for divorce on January
12, 1987.

The defendant was personally served on January

23, 1987, in Bell County, Texas.

On May 26, 1987, the
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defendant filed his answer and Counterclaim

for divorce.

The plaintiff filed a reply on June 3, 1987.
A pre-trial settlement hearing was held August 12,
1987,

establishing

the

issues

for

trial

as

"Custody,

visitation, plaintiff's wedding rings, alimony, debts and
attorney fees".
plaintiff

and

stipulated
paternal

Temporary custody and child support to the
child

to.

visitation

The

grandparents

to

pre-trial
to have

defendant is in Texas".

the

order

defendant

provided

standard

were

for

visitation

the

"when

Visitation was further ordered by

the Court on September 28, 1987.

Witnesses at trial were

Janette Deeben for the plaintiff, and Derick Deeben, Carlene
Deeben and Bruce Van Dyke Deeben for the defendant.
Disposition in the Court below
The

grounds

for

divorce

irreconcilable differences.
divorce to both parties.
either party.
children

the

and

the

plaintiff.

amended

The Court granted

to

be

a mutual

There was no alimony awarded to

The Court awarded joint custody of the minor

with

defendant

were

The

physical

custody

physical

defendant

custody
was

of

Heather

to

the

Kevin

to

the

of

ordered

to

children support to the plaintiff for Kevin.

pay

monthly

The Court did

not make a determination at this time for child support for
Heather.

The custody for Heather was to change on the

Sunday following the order.

The change took place.

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

-5-

The plaintiff moved for a stay of the order which
was denied on January 19, 1988, and the divorce decree was
entered January 20, 1988.

The decree awarded joint custody

of both minor children and ordered that each share with one
another, any
church

and all medical matters,

matters

or

social

matters

school

involving

matters,
the

minor

children.
Statement of Facts Relevant to the issues Presented
The parties to this action were married on September
6, 1984, at a time when they were 19 and 20 years old.
wife was the older one.
goals at the time.

The

Both were pursuing educational

They lived together at Logan, and he

worked at Trimiller Packing Company.
At the end of 1985, the plaintiff went to live in
Roy with the child, Heather, and the defendant went to New
Jersey with the United States Army.

Both parties expected

to further family finances and meet the defendants future
educational goals.

(Transcript: page 127, Lines 9-14)

They

rejoined each other at Ft. Hood, Texas, in 1986.
However, the plaintiff/appellant did not adjust to
army life.

She did not eat well and she barely fed Heather

or attend to the childfs needs.

(Transcript page 113-114).

She left Texas in October, 1986, but returned in November.
Plaintiff left the defendant and Texas for good at
the end of December, 1986, and brought this divorce action
on January 12, 1987.

(record page 1)
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The army has chaplains (transcript page 113, Lines
14-15), compassionate assignments (transcript page 93, Line
14), hardship discharges (transcript page 92, Line 19) and
reserve army units (transcript page 99, Lines 12-13).

The

defendant sought help with his family problems from the
army.

In March, 1987, he did visit Utah, but had to return

to Texas.

In July, 1987, the defendant received a hardship

discharge from the Army and a reserve unit assignment in
Utah.

This was honorable service.

(transcript page 99,

line 4)
The Plaintiff/Appellant has suggested that the trial
court has acted

in an

intemperate

and

angry manner in

finding both parties fit and proper persons to be custodial
parents and in expressing a need for cooperation in the care
of their children.
In the bench ruling of November 13, 1987, the judge
states:
"... I just explain why I am doing what I am
doing. It's not to be cruel . . . but to
let you know why I did what I did and its not
always kind . . .
(Record:

p. 131, lines 9-12)

and, "those are my reasons".
(Record: P. 139, Line 10)
Among those reasons:
(a) " . . . each party is an equal contributor
in whatever (their) inability to get along.
(Record: P. 133, Lines 1 & 2)
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(b) " . . . the husband has reacted violently
on times.
(Record:
(c)

P. 133, Line 6)

"I don't condone it.

(Record: P. 133, Line 11
(d) " . . . the wife was often the agitator and
often the instigator.
(Record:

P. 133, Lines 18 & 19)

(e) "I am absolutely satisfied that both parties
love the children.
(Record:

P. 134, Lines 8 & 9)

(f) "I am not sure one would be any more prime
(as caretaker) than the other
(Record:

P. 134, Lines 20 & 21)

(g) " . . . he was with the child and did things
with the child."
(Record:

P. 135, lines 1 and 2)

(h) "Both these parties have got these children to
care for and they are both trying to get through
school and both finding the necessity of working .."
(Record:

P. 136, Lines 5-7)

(i) "In Texas ... the Court does not believe
Janette primarily cared for the child Heather."
(Record: P. 137, lines 19 and 20)
(j) "... he recognized the problem to immediately
do something about it."
(Record:

P. 138, lines 4 & 5)

(k) "I can't exclude, Janette, the threats of
suicide. I donft have to believe that they were
serious, but they are certainly suggestive of
psychological problems . . ."
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(Record:

P. 138, line 10)

(1) "I tend to believe that you (Janette) were
using paregoric improperly . . . "
(Record:

P. 138, Lines 18 & 19).

(m) "The wife's home seems to be almost too
crowded . . . "
(Record:

P. 139, Lines 4 and 5)

As to the matter of Visitation:
(a) "The children are to be in the same home each
time there is weekend visitation."
(Record:

P. 127, Lines 22 and 23)

(b) "For summer visitation . . . each party should
have an opportunity of having both children in the
home for an uninterrupted period of time ... a full
month."
(Record:

P. 6, Lines 3-6)

(c) "In the visitation . . . where one child is
in each home, I suppose you just have to be . . .
reasonable."
(Record:

P. 136, Lines 23-25)

(d) "I don't think that the defendant and his
parents having always been given the visitation
under the Court's Order that they had a right to."
(Record:
and,

P. 137, Lines 15-17)

"I think Heather will be best cared for if she is in
the home with his (the father's) parents."
(Record:

P. 128, lines 20-25)

Under the provisions of 30-3-10(2), Utah Code, as
amended,
These

these

are

not

are
the

relevant

and

pre-conceived

intemperate and angry judge.

reasoned

deliberations.

pronouncements

of

an

In awarding custody, the court
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has considered which person is most likely to act in the
best interests of the child, including allowing the child
frequent

and

continuing

contacts with

the

non-custodial

parent.
The trial court heard testimony by Derick Deeben
that the plaintiff did not care for the child in Texas.
(Transcript:

P. 82, Lines 20-25; Page 83, lines 8-13), and

that the care had improved somewhat on the plaintiff's final
return to Utah (Transcript:

P. 85, Lines 4-12).

another pattern of injury to Heather emerged

However,

(Transcript:

P. 85, Lines 23-25; Page 86, Lines 1-25; Page 87, Lines 124) .

Heather had been medicated with paregoric

extended period of time as well.

(transcript:

for an

P. 89, Lines

3-25.)
Charlene Deeben testified as to the effects of the
child's experience with the paregoric (Transcript:

P. 120,

Lines 1-25; Page 121, Lines 1-25: Page 122, Lines 1-25, and
Page 123, Lines 1-10.)
The witness, Deeben,
training

in

making

the

is a registered
observations

nurse with

testified

to.

(Transcript: P 123, lines 12-24 and page 124, lines 20-23.)
The

trial

court

found

the

concerns

of

the

defendant/respondent justified and found that the hardship
discharge from the army was motivated for a concern for the
welfare of his children and the necessity for him to return
to Utah. (Record:

Page 135, Lines 1-6; page 137, lines 18-
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25; page 131, lines 13-24).
19)

That was a

(Transcript:

Page 96, liens 3-

primary reason why he left the military

service.
SUMMARY OF THE ARGUMENT
The trial court has the independent responsibility
and duty to make findings and draw conclusions from those
findings as to an award of child custody.
determination of custody
standard

for

In an initial

in the divorce proceeding, the

determination

is

that

Legislature in 30-3-10, Utah Code.

enacted

by

the

Change of circumstance

is not a threshold requirement in making the determination.
The trial Court has wide discretion in weighing the
circumstances found from the evidence and the credibility of
the witnesses.
best

interests

Gender bias is not to be indulged in and the
of the child

is weighed

by

all

of the

relevant factors, only one of which is the identity of a
psychological
disadvantage

parent.
for the

In
child

some
to

be

cases

it

in the

may
care

be

a

of the

psychological parent.
Moreover, the issue on appeal is not whether the
trial court's exercise of its discretion accords with the
views of a reviewing court on the circumstances, but whether
its findings are supported by substantial evidence, so long
as it is not so flagrantly unjust as to constitute an abuse
of discretion.
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ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT IS FREE TO RELY ON
WHATEVER PARTS OF AN EXPERTS OPINION
THE COURT FINDS PROBATIVE AND HELPFUL.
On the issue of custody of the parties two minor
children, the Court found that both the plaintiff, mother
and defendant, father were proper, fit and good parents.
Having to choose between them, the court concluded that the
defendant, father was in a better position, with the aid of
his parents, to provide a stable home life for the older
child.
On her

appeal

from

the Judgment,

the

plaintiff

argues that the Home Study and Custody Evaluation ordered by
the Court which was in the proceedings before the Court,
recommended that custody of both minor children be awarded
to the plaintiff.

That report also noted, however, that

both the plaintiff and the defendant had at times used poor
judgment

and

abilities

of

both
the

have

misgivings

other.

Also,

about

the

the

report

parenting

discredited

testimony by the defendant of abuse of the child Heather
when in the temporary custody of the plaintiff.

This was

testimony which the trial court was free to credit regarding
the plaintiffs behavior and its effect on the child.
It would be anomalous to require a trial court to
assign particular weight to a report which

is based on

statements that the trial court may evaluate differently and
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on circumstances that may have changed.

The best interests

of the child does not permit such a predetermined weighing
of evidence.
The weight to be given to psychological reports by
professionals in mental health is, in matters of custody, as
it is elsewhere, a question for the trier of fact.
opinion

must

be

evaluated

in

light

of

the

opportunity to come to a reasoned conclusions.

Expert
expert's

Long-range

forecasts about future child development are sometimes based
upon relatively few and brief interviews and tests conducted
under circumstances of stress.
652 P2d 934, (Ut -

See:

Martinez vs. Martinez

1982).

A Court has an independent responsibility to assure
itself of the suitability of the parent to whom the child is
primarily attached.

On this record

, the trial court

exercised that responsibility.
POINT II
IT IS THE DUTY OF THE COURT TO
DETERMINE NOT WHICH PARENT WAS
THE BETTER CUSTODIAN IN THE PAST
BUT WHICH IS THE BETTER CUSTODIAN
NOW.
In the exercise of awesome responsibility to find
the most-likely custodial arrangement for the children of
divorce, the court must take into account the parents' past
behavior.

It

must

evaluate

their

present

and

future

parenting ability and the consistency of their parenting for
the purpose of determining which parent will better foster
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the childrens' growth, development, and well-being.

See:

30-3-10(1) and (2), Utah Code, as amended (1988).
Where, as here, the record is void of any previous
determination of custody, the court will apply the standard
in Sec. 30-3-10 in lieu of the standard
custody

outlined

in Hoaae

vs. Hoaae

for change of

and

its' progeny.

Sanderson vst Tyyon, 739 P2d 623 (Ut - 1987).
Temporary

custody

of

the

children

had

been

stipulated to the plaintiff before trial, but the custody of
the children was to be an issue at trial.
had not been determined.

The circumstances

There was no reason to find a

change of circumstances to change custody.

In fact, custody

was not changed; it was determined in the first instance.
Although there was evidence favoring an award of
custody to the plaintiff/Appellant, the award of the custody
of Heather to the Defendant/Respondent was not flagrantly
unjust nor an abuse of discretion.
disadvantage

for

the

child

to

In some cases it is a

be

in

the

care

of

the

psychological parent, as the trial court has found.
The plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker.

Speaking

of Heather as an only child at the time, she was not always
properly

fed,

diapered,

or

put

to

bed.

The

defendant/respondent, spent as much time as a caretaker when
he was in the home.
specifically

found

(Record:
that

the

p. 151-152).

It has been

plaintiff/appellant

used

paregoric on Heather, after the birth of the second child,
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when it was not medically necessary.

This made the child

lethargic and unable to sleep properly and neared the point
of being habit forming.

(Record:

P. 152)

In addition, the

evidence shows that the newborn child could ingest paragoric
from his mother's milk.
by

the

There was evidence of past behavior

plaintiff/appellant

suggestive

of

psychological

problems.
The Plaintiff/appellant has responded better as a
caretaker with counsel and assistance.

(Record P. 152).

The custody award by the Court has spread the load and
provided counsel and assistance over a long period of time
pending any change in circumstances.
Moreover, if the findings seem terse, but still
suggest

the

weight

accorded

to

the

testimony

of

the

witnesses by the trial court and outline the basis of the
custody award, appellate review can find that there was
competent evidence to support the judgment.

Pennington vs

Pennington, 711 P2d 254 (Ut - 1985).
Should

it

appear

at

some

future

time

that

circumstances have changed to the extent that the child's
interests and welfare will be best served by a review of
custody, the matter may again be brought to the trial court
upon a proper petition and showing.

Fontenot vs. Fontenot,

714 P2d 1131 (Utah, 1986)
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POINT III
EVERY APPEAL IS NOT A SECOND CHANCE
TO ACCOMPLISH WHAT SHOULD BE DETERMINED AT TRIAL.
In initial custody awards, the trial court is given
broad discretion.

Appellate review of the findings is made

under a "clearly erroneous" standard.

Davis vs. Davis. 749

P2d 647 Ut, 1988).
It is a rare case in which a disappointed litigant
will be able to demonstrate abuse of a trial courts broad
discretion in family matters.
The authority to exercise the judicial discretion
under the circumstances revealed by the Findings is not for
the appellate court, but upon the trial court.

A mere

difference of opinion or judgment cannot justify appellate
court intervention short of a conviction that the action of
the trial court is one which discloses a clear abuse of
discretion.
The Utah Supreme Court in Alexander vs. Alexander
737 P2d 221 (Ut- 1987), Note 1 page 223, notes:
"Plaintiff urges us to apply our usual standard
of review only in cases in which the trial court
clearly applied the appropriate guidelines and
rules, but to substitute our judgment for that of
the trial court "materially or substantially"
deviated from the best interests of the child rule.
We think that standard would be ill-advised and
would simply confuse the issue by forcing us to
determine what is in the best interests of the child
and then determine if the trial court materially and
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substantially deviated from the decision we would
have reached. Such a standard would be inappropriate and render every appeal a second chance to
accomplish what should have been determined at trial
Where there is evidence to support a ruling the task
of determining the best interests of the child in a custody
dispute is for the trial judge, who has the opportunity to
personally observe and evaluate the witnesses.
POINT IV
ASSESSMENTS OF THE APPLICABILITY AND
RELATIVE WEIGHT OF THE VARIOUS FACTORS
IN A PARTICULAR CASE LIE WITHIN THE
DISCRETION OF THE TRIAL COURT.
The plaintiff/appellant argues that the trial court,
as function related factors in custody awards, has (1) split
custody of the two siblings, (2) interfered with previous
custody arrangements,

(3) overlooked

the element

of the

personal care to be provided for Heather, and (4) failed to
give

proper

deference

to

the

element

of

the

primary

caretaker, all to the detriment of, and against the best
interests of the minor child, Heather.
Function related factors were outlined by the Utah
Supreme Court in Hutchison vs. Hutchison. 649 P2d 38 (Ut 1982) at P.41, with the factors not necessarily listed in
any particular order of importance.
Also,

in

Hutchison,

the

Court

states

that

assessments of the applicability and relative weight of the
various

factors

in

a

particular

case

lie

discretion of the trial court.
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within

the

However, it is well established that only where the
trial court action is so flagrantly unjust as to constitute
an abuse of that discretion should
interpose

its

own

judgment.

the appellant

Under

forum

Hutchison

the

applicability of the factors varies with the circumstances
found by the trial court.
In the later case of Pusev vs. Pusey, 728 P2d 117
(Ut - 1986), the Utah Supreme Court stated that the time has
come to discontinue support, even in dictum, for the notion
of gender based preference in child custody cases.

The

choice instead should be based on function related factors.
The identity of the primary caretaker during the marriage is
prominent, though not exclusive.

Another important factor

should be the stability of the environment provided by each
parent.
Also, in Pusey, at page 120,
the trial court
parents,

its

it observes that where

found both parties to be fit custodial

ultimate

judgment

on

custody

assessment of the complex situation before it.

required

an

That choice

is within its discretion.
In the instant case, the trial court assessed all of
the factors.

It made findings as to the primary caretaker,

the prospects for personal care and the splitting of custody
for the siblings.

It determined that the element of the

psychological parent was outweighed by other considerations.
Moreover, bonding between the siblings was not great.
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In

Pusey, and many other cases, the court has affirmed split
custody arrangements.
Both parties have shortcomings.

Both testified as

to their work patterns and their desire to continue with
their schooling.
defendant testified

(Transcript pages 5, 9, 90, 97)
as to his intention

The

to complete an

apartment for him and the children in the basement of his
parent's home in Salem.

(Transcript p. 112.)

The plaintiff

testified as to her objective to afford an apartment of her
own near her parents home, and perhaps have the aid of her
mother and sisters with child care.

(Transcript, p. 47.)

As to all of this, and to other weighty factors of
stress upon each of the parties, the trial court stated its
purpose to facilitate visitation. (Record: P. 136, lines 2325); P. 125, lines 22-25), and that Heather will be best
cared for if she is in the home of the defendant's parents.
(Record 128, Lines 24 and 25).
The trial court weighed all of the factors raised by
the plaint iff/appellant, and others of its choosing, and it
made its order accordingly.
Moreover, the order is in keeping with the standards
set out by the legislature
amended.

in 30-3-10(2) Utah Code as

The judge has determined which parent is most

likely to act in the best interests of the child, and has
included an allowance for frequent and continuing contact
with the non-custodial parent as well as the two siblings.
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The order is well crafted in both regards, and as the court
finds appropriate.

There is no abuse of discretion here.

C O N C L U S I O N
Many

of

the

circumstances

of

regrettable, but they are common enough.
must

often

weigh

the

least

this

case

are

The trial court

detrimental

available

alternative.
The Plaintiff/appellant has made no showing legally
sufficient to require reversal of the trial courts1 custody
order.

It

is the trial

judicial

discretion

to

interests of a child.

court

determine

that must
what

is

exercise the
in

the

best

On the record here awarding custody

of the minor child Heather to her father is not so unjust as
to constitute an abuse of discretion.
The custody

order of the trial

court

affirmed.
DATED this

/Q

day of January, 1989.
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should be

CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE
I hereby certify that I served four copies of the
foregoing Brief of Respondent to ROBERT L. NEELEY, Attorney
for Appellant, 2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah,
84401 this 17th day of January, 1989.-
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UTAH CODE, AS AMENDED

30-3-10. Custody of children in case of separation or divorce — Custody consideration.
(1) If a husband and wife having minor children
are separated, or their marriage is declared void or
dissolved, the court shall make an order for the future
care and custody of the minor children as it considers
appropriate. In determining custody, the court shall
consider the best interests of the child and the past
conduct and demonstrated moral standards of each of
the parties. The court may inquire of the children and
take into consideration the children's desires regarding the future custody, but the expressed desires are
not controlling and the court may determine the children's custody otherwise.
(2) In awarding custody, the court shall consider,
among other factors the court finds relevant, which
parent is most likely to act in the best interests of the
child, including allowing the child frequent and continuing contact with the noncustodial parent as the
court finds appropriate.
1988
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Janette Deeben,
P l a i n t i f f and A p p e l l a n t ,

O R D E R ,;.; u '

v.
D e r i c k R. D e e b e n ,

Case N o . 8 8 0 1 0 4 - C A

D e f e n d a n t and R e s p o n d e n t .
B e f o r e J u d g e s J a c k s o n , O r m e and Greenwood

(On L a w and M o t i o n )

T h i s m a t t e r is b e f o r e the Court on a p p e l l a n t ' s M o t i o n for
Summary D i s p o s i t i o n seeking reversal of the trial c o u r t ' s child
c u s t o d y d e t e r m i n a t i o n o n the basis of m a n i f e s t e r r o r .
This
C o u r t , having reviewed the record and the m a t e r i a l submitted by
the p a r t i e s , and having heard oral argument o n t h e m o t i o n n o w
p e n d i n g , m a k e s the following d e t e r m i n a t i o n .
IT IS H E R E B Y O R D E R E D T H A T appellant's M o t i o n for Summary
D i s p o s i t i o n o n the basis of m a n i f e s t error is d e n i e d .
IT IS F U R T H E R O R D E R E D T H A T the case is remanded to the trial
court w i t h d i r e c t i o n s to amend the findings of fact to reflect
the c o u r t ' s d e t e r m i n a t i o n of the "best interests of the child"
u n d e r the s t a n d a r d s a r t i c u l a t e d in case law and to enter judgment
accordingly.
R. U t a h C t . A p p . 3 0 ( a ) ; Smith v. Smith, 726 P.2d
423 (Utah 1 9 8 6 ) ; H u t c h i s o n v. H u t c h i s o n , 649 P.2d 38 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) ;
H o g g e v. H o g a e , 649 P.2d 51 (Utah 1 9 8 2 ) .
IT IS F U R T H E R O R D E R E D T H A T this Court shall retain
j u r i s d i c t i o n for further c o n s i d e r a t i o n of the m e r i t s of this
appeal following entry of the amended findings and c o n c l u s i o n s
and an amended j u d g m e n t . 1

1.
If appellant w i s h e s to pursue the appeal after the lower
court p r o c e e d i n g s , a new n o t i c e of appeal need not be filed.
A p p e l l a n t instead should n o t i f y this Court and supplement the
record as required, and a new briefing schedule w i l l be issued
by the C l e r k of the C o u r t .
O u r retention of j u r i s d i c t i o n means
that a p p e l l a n t ' s issues c o n c e r n i n g the p r o p r i e t y of the c u s t o d y
d e t e r m i n a t i o n remain v i a b l e if not rendered moot b y the new
proceedings.
See State v. G i b b o n s , 740 P.2d 1309, 1311 n.2
(Utah 1 9 8 7 ) .
If respondent chooses to appeal from any d e c i s i o n
after remand, h e must i n i t i a t e a new a p p e a l .
'•^iq
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DATED this 2*1? day of April, 1988,
FOR THE COURT:

Nocman H. J a c k s o n ,

880104-CA

Judge
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DALE E. STRATFORD
ATTORNEY AT LAW
1218 First Security Bank Bldg
Ogden, Utah, 84401
Telephone: 393-7085
IN THE DISTRICT COURT OF DAVIS COUNTY, STATE OF UTAH

AMENDED
JANETTE DEEBEN

) FINDINGS OF FACT and
Plaintiff,

)

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Civil 40735

DERICK R. DEEBEN

)
Defendant.

)

The above entitled matter having come on regularly
for hearing on the 13th day of November, 1987, and plaintiff
appearing and being represented by her attorney, ROBERT L.
NEELEY, and the defendant appearing and being represented by
his attorney, DALE E.

STRATFORD and each of the parties

having called and presented witnesses and the Court having
considered all evidence presented to it, including the
written report of Steven L. Watson, psychotherapist, and
having considered the argument of counsel, the Court now
therefore enters its:
FINDINGS OF FACT:
1.

That the plaintiff was a resident of Davis

County, Utah for a period in excess of three months prior to
the filing of this action.
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3.

That as a result of the marriage between the

parties two children have been born as issue of the
marriage, to wit:

HEATHER LYN DEEBEN, born March 1, 1985

and KEVIN ROY DEEBEN, born July 1, 1987.
4.

That since the marriage and particularly during

the last number of months the parties have developed
irreconcilable differences and each of the parties are
entitled to be granted a divorce, one from the other.
5.

That the each of the parties are equally capable

of supporting the family as the other and the plaintiff,
having made arrangements to work outside the home and the
defendant having made arrangements to complete his
education, the Court finds that no alimony need be awarded
to either party.
6.

The Court finds that the defendant is not

delinquent in any of his child support obligations up to the
time of the granting of the divorce and specifically finds
that the August, 1987 payment of $240.00 was paid as well as
the other monthly obligations which the Court had ordered to
be paid.
7.

The Court finds that each of the parties are fit

and proper persons to have the care, custody and control of
the minor children and the Court finds that each of the
parties should be awarded joint custody of the two minor
children, with the defendant having primary Care for the
minor child Heather and the plaintiff having primary care
for the minor child Kevin.

It being the specific intention

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

t

of the Court that each

of the parties

share with one

another, any and all medical matters, school matters, church
matters or social matters involving the minor children•
The Court further finds as follows:
A.

The children's best interests and the special

attributes of the parents determine the primary care and
custody specified above,
B.

At this time, the children's feelings are not

susceptible to making an expression of choice between
parents.
C.

The child, Kevin, has a special need to be with

the plaintiff while nursing.
D.

The child Heather has no particular special need

to be with the plaintiff
£•

There is no particular special need created by

any bond between siblings, there being no particular
attachment of the sister to the new born brother at this
time.
F.

The general interest of the child Heather is any

particular current environment is not great.

She is happy

and well adjusted in the defendant's care.
G.

The character or stutus of both parents is the

H.

The capacity or willingness to act as the

same.

custodial parent for Heather is very great in the defendant.
I.

The moral character of both parents is the same.
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J.

Both parties exhibit emotional immaturity to

some degree.

However, the plaintiff has expressed suicidal

tendencies on at least two occasions.
K.

The depth of desire to be a responsible parent

has been exhibited by the defendant.

He gave up what would

have been a good job in the military for the possibility of
having custody of his children.

He took a hardship

discharge from the military so that he could hopefully have
custody of one or both of these children.
L.

Personal care for Heather will be shared with

one or the other set of grandparents, no matter which party
has primary custody.
school.

Both parents are limited by work and

The plaintiff is further limited by the needs of

the infant child Kevin.
M.

Neither party suffers from impairment.

Both

parties love the children and want what is best for the
children.
N.

Past custody patterns and the role of primary

caretaker must be put into the context of the defendants
military service.

Had he not been in the military, both

parents would have ranked as jointly being caretakers.
0.

When the parties were together in Texas, the

plaintiff did not provide primary care for Heather
exclusively.

Instances of diaper rash, the unwise use of

paregoric on the child, meal patterns and neglect were
ameliorated by the defendants concern to be with Heather, to
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do things with the child, and to do things for these
problems.
P.

The plaintiff left the defendant in Texas,

taking the children with her, and returned to her parent's
home in Utah.

Since then there have been indications of

bruising on Heather.
Q.

Religious factors rank equally with either

R.

Kinship factors rank equally with either party.

S.

Housing conditions for Heather are better with

party.

the defendant, and are somewhat constricted with the
plaintiff.

The defendant and his parents were not always

given the visitation that they had a right to under the
Court's preliminary orders with custody in the plaintiff.
For the child, Heather to enjoy the association of both
parents in the future, primary custody is better in the home
of the defendant.
T.

Each party is an equal contributor in whatever

inability to get along in the marriage has been; no one more
or less than the other.

Both parties looked to "mom and

dad11 for decisions better made by the parties together.
U.

Cooperation and the give and take in making

decisions for the children will be facilitated with primary
custody of Heather being with the defendant.
8.

The court finds that neither party has Health

and Accident and/or dental insurance coverage for the
children at this time.

Each should be required to pay one-
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half of all medical costs that are incurred by each child in
each home.
9.

Defendant is capable of paying $80.00 per month

as and for child support for the minor child Kevin, which
child resides in the home of the plaintiff.

The Court will

hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to the
defendant child support for the support of the minor child
Heather.

The court would find, however, that at such time

as the plaintiff finishes her schooling, that the Court
would expect the Uniform Child Support Schedule to apply in
determining the child support that the plaintiff would be
required to pay to the defendant for the support of the
minor child Heather.

As the defendants earning capacity

increases the Uniform Child Support Schedule should be used
to determine the support to be paid to the plaintiff for the
support of the minor child Kevin.
10.

The Court further finds that there should be

an evaluation of the child support on the 1st of January of
each year to determine if the Uniform Schedule should
dictate a payment of a greater child support than that
heretofore ordered by the Court.
11.

The Court further finds that visitation for

the children and the parents should be as follows:
The Plaintiff shall visit with the minor child
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays.
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather.

Provided,

however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00
p.m. on Saturday.

If the defendant is going to exercise the

visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However,
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends.

It

being the specific desire of* the Court that both children be
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children
together in their home on alternate weekends.

It is the

intent of the Court that for the first year that the
defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of
the two parties.

Provided further, however, after a period

of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall
alternate.

One weekend it would be the responsibility of

the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the
defendant.
Summer vacation with the minor children should
include a full month in each of the homes of both parents,
so that the mother would have both children in her home from
June 15th to July 15th of each year. Provided, however, that
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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one weekend in the middle of the month, the defendant would
pick up both children for that weekend.

The defendant

should have both children in his home between July 16th and
August 15th, provided however, the plaintiff would have one
weekend with the children in the middle of the month.

Each

of the parties are to notify the other party as to which
weekend during the summer visitation they would desire to
exercise their visitation with the minor children.
The Court believes and finds, as a matter of fact,
that there are special events in the lives of both parties,
such as family reunions and other activities which may not
fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer month
visitation, and consideration for each others needs as to
special events should in fact be considered and if possible,
accommodated or schedules so arranged by both parties to
meet those needs and desires so far as visitation with the
minor children.
12.

The Court further finds that each of the

parties are capable of paying their own attorney fees and
costs incurred in connection with this matter.
13.

The Court further finds that certain property,

including various quilts, clothing and various toys are in
fact the personal property of the minor child Heather and
that her property

should be with her, except that the

plaintiff should retain such clothing and toys as would be
necessary for her while she visits with the plaintiff in the
plaintiff's home.

The plaintiff also has possession of two
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keepsake

dolls

and

cabbage

patch

dolls

property of the minor child Heather.

which

are

the

Those items should

remain in the possession of the plaintiff for the benefit of
the minor child, Heather.

All other items of personal

property of the minor child should be turned over to the
defendant

for the use and benefit of the minor child,

Heather.
14.

Each of the parties, prior to the commencement

of this action, had their own personal property in their
possession and those properties are to be the property of
the person who has them in* their possession.

Provided,

however, that there was introduced at the time of trial, a
list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed would be
divided

and are listed on the attached sheet.

All items

bearing a check were to be turned over to the defendant as
his sole and separate property.

The remaining items of

wedding gifts were to become the personal property of the
plaintiff

and

should

be

delivered

to

the

defendant

immediately.
15.

The defendant has in his possession the 1978

Pickup truck, a VCR and television, which the plaintiff has
indicated she does not claim an interest in and they should
be the property of the defendant.
16.

During the course of the trial, testimony was

given concerning the various quilts and the court finds, as
a matter of fact, that all the quilts, other than the quilt
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that belonged to the child, should become the property of
the plaintiff.
17.

The Court further finds that with regard to the

debts of the parties that each of the parties should be
required to pay any debts that they may have incurred since
the time of their separation.

Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at

the time of the birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not
to use the medical facilities available to her without her
cost and which was provided by the defendant through his
military service, that the plaintiff should be required to
pay any and all medical bills that may have been incurred in
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin.

The Court,

however, finds that the defendant should pay the debts and
obligations due and owing to the Utah Valley Credit Union,
of approximately $2400.00 and the obligation for the jewelry
purchased by the parties in the sum of approximately $400.00
and the J. C. Penney Account in the sum of approximately
$300.00.
18.

The Court finds as a matter of fact that it

would be in the best interests of the children that the
transfer of custody occur immediately after the court
hearing of November 13, 1987 and the transfer of all
properties occur immediately thereafter.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court
enters its:
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CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

That each of the parties are fit and proper

persons to have the care, custody and control of the minor
children and that each of the parties should be awarded
joint custody of the two minor children, with the defendant
having primary care for the minor child Heather and the
plaintiff having primary care for the minor child Kevin.

It

being the specific intention of the Court that each of the
parties share with one another, any and all medical matters,
school matters, church matters or social matters involving
the minor children.
2.

That neither party has health and Accident

and/or dental insurance coverage for the children at this
time.

Each should be required to pay one-half of all

medical costs that are incurred by each child in each home.
3.

That defendant is to pay the sum of $80.00 per

month as and for child support for the minor child Kevin,
which child resides in the home of the plaintiff.

The Court

will hold in abeyance any order that the plaintiff pay to
the defendant child support for the support of the minor
child Heather.

That at such time as the plaintiff finishes

her schooling, that the Court would expect the Uniform Child
Support Schedule to apply in determining the child support
that the plaintiff would be required to pay to the defendant
for the support of the minor child Heather.

As the

defendants earning capacity increases the Uniform Child
Support Schedule should be used to determine the support to
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be paid to the plaintiff for the support of the minor child
Kevin.
4.

That there be an evaluation of the child support

on the 1st of January of each year to determine if the
Uniform Schedule should dictate a payment of a greater child
support than that heretofore ordered by the Court.
5.

That visitation for the children and the parents

should be as follows:
The plaintiff shall visit with the minor child
Heather every other weekend and have alternate holidays.
The defendant shall have visitation rights with the minor
child Kevin for 45 minutes prior to the time that the minor
child Heather is delivered to the home of the plaintiff and
45 minutes when the defendant arrives at the home of the
plaintiff to pick up the minor child Heather.

Provided,

however, the defendant may, if he so desires, visit with the
minor child Kevin, between the hours of 3:00 p.m. and 7:00
p.m. on Saturday.

If the defendant is going to exercise the

visitation rights from 3:00 to 7:00 p.m. on Saturday, the
plaintiff should be notified 24 hours in advance. However,
after a period of one year, then the minor children shall
visit with both of the parents on alternate weekends.

It

being the specific desire of the Court that both children be
in the home of the same parent on weekends so that each of
the parents will have the opportunity to have both children
together in their home on alternate weekends.

It is the

intent of the Court that for the first year that the
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defendant make the necessary arrangements to deliver the
child Heather to the home of the plaintiff, inasmuch as
there is substantial travel distance between the homes of
the two parties.

Provided further, however, after a period

of one year, the transportation of the minor children shall
alternate.

One weekend it would be the responsibility of

the plaintiff and the other the responsibility of the
defendant.
Summer

vacation

with

the

minor

children

should

include a full month in each of the homes of both parents,
so that the mother would have both children in her home from
June 15th to July 15th of each year.

Provided, however, the

plaintiff would have one weekend with the children in the
middle of the month.

Each of the parties are to notify the

other party as to which weekend during the summer visitation
they would desire to exercise their visitation with the
minor children.
That there are special events in the lives of both
parties, such as family reunions and other activities which
may not fall on the appropriate weekend or during the summer
month visitation, and consideration for each others needs as
to a special event should
possible, accommodated

in fact be considered and if

or schedules

so arranged

by both

parties to meet those needs and desires so far as visitation
with the minor children.
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6.

That each of the parties are capable of paying

their own attorney fees and costs incurred in connection
with this matter.
7.

That certain property, including various quilts,

clothing and various toys are in fact the personal property
of the

minor child Heather and that her property should be

wit her, except that the plaintiff should retain such
clothing and toys as would be necessary for her while she
visits with the plaintiff in the plaintiff's home. The
plaintiff also has possession of two keepsake dolls and
cabbage patch dolls which are the property of the minor
child Heather.

Those items should remain in the possession

of the plaintiff for the benefit of the minor child,
Heather.

All other items of personal property of the minor

child should be turned over to the defendant for the use and
benefit of the minor child, Heather.
8.

That each of the parties, prior to the

commencement of this action, had their own personal property
in their possession and those properties are to be the
property of the person who has them in their possession.
Provided, however, that there was introduced at the time of
trial, a list of wedding gifts which the parties have agreed
would be divided are listed on the attached sheet. All
items bearing a check were to be turned over to the
defendant as his sole and separate property.

The remaining

items of wedding gifts were to become the personal property
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of the plaintiff and should be delivered to the defendant
immediately..
9.

That the defendant be awarded as his sole and

separate property the 1978 Pickup truck, a VCR and
television, which the plaintiff has indicated she does not
claim an interest in and they should be the property of the
defendant.
10.

That all the quilts, other than the quilt that

belonged to the child, Heather, shall be the property of the
plaintiff.
11.

That each of the parties be required to pay any

debts that they may have incurred since the time of their
separation.

Inasmuch as the plaintiff, at the time of the

birth of the minor child, Kevin, chose not to use the
medical facilities available to her without her cost and
which was provided by the defendant through his military
service, that the plaintiff should be required to pay any
and all medical bills that may have been incurred in
connection with the birth of the child, Kevin.

The

defendant shall pay the debts and obligations due and owing
to the Utah Valley Credit Union, of approximately $2400.00
and the obligation for the jewelry purchased by the parties
in the sum of approximately $400.00 and the J. C. Penney
Account in the sum of approximately $3 00.00 and hold the
defendant harmless therefrom.
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•12.

That the transfer of custody occur

immediately after the court hearing of November 13, 1987 and
the transfer of all properties occur immediately thereafter.
DATED this.^th day ofriaaua^y, 1988.

•

'"..^iC, /
--DiSTRICT COURT4; JUDGE
APPROVED AS TO FORM

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney for Plaintiff
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In the District Court of the Second Judicial District
IN AND FOR THE

County of Davis, State of Utah

MINUTE ENTRY
J a n u a r y 19, 1988

JANETTE DEEBEN

Plaintiff
Date

VS.

Case No.
DERICK.R. DEEBEN

Defendant

40735

DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Judge
Nancy Davis, Reporter
Kathy Potts, Clerk

J

This matter comes before the Court for Plaintiff's Motion to
Stay Judgment. The plaintiff is present and represented by
Robert Neeley. The defendant is present and represented by Dale
Stratford.
Mr. Neeley presents oral argument.
oral argument.

Mr. Stratford presents

The transcript of the court's ruling will be appended to the
findings of fact prepared by Dale Stratford. The court will deny
Mr. Neeley's motion to reconsider entering the order of custody.

%

*£0
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IN THE SECOND JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT
IN AND FOR DAVIS COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
-0O0-

JANETTE DEEBEN,
REPORTER'S TRANSCRIPT OF
PROCEEDINGS

Plaintiff,
vs.
DERICK R. DEEBEN,

:

Civil No. 40735

Defendant.

BE IT REMEMBERED that on Friday, November 13, 1987,
the above-entitled matter came on for TRIAL in the Second
Judicial District Court in and for Davis County, State of
Utah, before the HONORABLE DOUGLAS L CORNABY, Presiding.
* * * *

A P P E A R A N C E S :
For the Plaintiff:

For the Defendant:

ROBERT L. NEELEY
Attorney at Law
2485 Grant Avenue, Suite 200
Ogden, Utah 84401
DALE E. STRATFORD
Attorney at Law
1218 First Security Bank
Ogden, Utah 84401
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Nancy H. Davis, C.S.R.

THE COURT:

The Court will make the following

findings and decision:

First, that the plaintiff was an

actual and bona fide resident of Davis County for at least
three months prior to the filing of this action, it having
been filed on January 12, 1987. Plaintiff and defendant are
husband and wife having married on September 6, 1984 at
Sunset, Utah.

Two children have been born issue of the

marriage, Heather Lyn Deeben, born March 1st, 1985 and Kevin
Roy Deeben, born July 1st, 1987.
The Court will allow the complaint to be amended as
requested by counsel to provide for irreconcilable differences
between the parties and we will find that there are
irreconcilable differences that have made the continuation of
the marriage impossible and we will grant a mutual divorce to
each party.

Award no alimony to either party.

One appears as

capable as the other of supporting the family.
While the plaintiff has the very small child in her
home at the current time to raise and care for, she has,
nevertheless, made arrangements to work outside of the home,
apparently, at her own choice and so, expects her to go on
doing that is not unreasonable.

To suggest that the

defendant, on the other hand, has not supported his family
after getting out of the service is, apparently, not fair nor
correct.
While he hasn't supported his wife, he, apparently,
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paid on a regular basis $80 per child per month.

Apparently,

that is the only thing he has been required by the Court to
do.

While he.was in the service he was required to spend or

pay $240 a month which, apparently, he paid each and every
month and the Court will find that he did pay it for the month
of August, 1987 as well as the other months.
Perhaps the biggest concern in this matter today, of
course, has been joint—or child custody and the Court is
going to direct that there be joint custody between both the
plaintiff and the defendant with the defendant to have the
primary custody of Heather and the plaintiff to have the
primary custody of Kevin.

Each of the parties, apparently,

neither party actually has health and accident and dental
insurance covering the children at this time.

Each will be

required to pay one-half of all medical costs that are
incurred by each child in each home.
This joint custody, while one parent that I have
granted the primary custody to, it's stated specifically joint
custody and it means joint in the sense that you will share
medical matters, school matters, church matters and social
matters.

r

v

This case has not been free of disagreements between
the parties in visitation and so on.

The only problem now is

that I suppose any rubbing of the hands or the knee or
whatever it may be on the sandpaper rubs both ways.
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So, I

assume that you will take the Court to heart in both and both
cooperate.

Without cooperation you will go on having the

disappointments and problems between you.
At this time the Court is going to direct that the
defendant pay $80 per month child support to the plaintiff for
the child Kevin.

I am not going to make a determination at

this time that the plaintiff should pay any child support to
the defendant for Heather, but at such time as she finishes
her schooling, would expect that the Uniform Child Support
Schedule would come into place and at that point she would be
required to pay the amount to him just exactly the same as any
time that his job, through the Uniform Child Support Schedule,
justifies a higher than $80 a month, but it will not be less
than that amount.

Uniform Schedule indicates that he should

be paying higher than that.

It will be based on the schedule.

Not that every single time there is a minor change, but
certainly that needs to be evaluated at least on the first of
January of every year.
MR. NEELEY:

Your Honor, I am concerned—confused.

Who have you awarded—
THE COURT:

Defendant is going to Heather and the

plaintiff is going to Kevin, even though counsel have argued
that the children should not be split up, the bonding is not
the same as with children when they are older, when they
become better acquainted, when they have been long associated
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with each other and I am not even so sure when the bonding
becomes so strong that either party should be denied a right
to have custody, just so that the parent can be satisfied with
the total custody or no custody, but that's not the basis for
the Court doing it here.
Now, with regard to visitation.

The visitation will

continue for the defendant as it has been in the past so far
as Kevin is concerned.

Forty-five minutes each time he makes

a trip up to see the child.

However, if he wants to make a

trip up on Saturday and spend a period of time like from 3:00
to 7:00 with the child, the Court finds no problem in that
whatsoever.

If the mother can work from 3:00 to 7:00,

certainly the father can take care of the child outside of the
home from 3:00 to 7:00.

I would think it would take some

communication between the parties to arrange for the care of
the child.
As such time as the child is one year old, I am
going to direct that then alternating visitation will begin on
the weekends and I am going to direct that when that takes
place

that the plaintiff is going to have the weekend and

alternating holiday visitation with Heather and vice versa
because the children are to be in the same home each time that
there is weekend visitation.
So, when the mother is having visitation, they will
both be there and when the defendant is having visitation,
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they will both be there.

Now, that's not now, but after the

child is one year of age.
'. The Court thinks that for summer visitation that
each party should have an opportunity of having both children
in the home for an uninterrupted period of time, almost
uninterrupted.

A full month.

I am going to let, during the

time of June 15 to July 15, I am going to let the mother have
both children in the home, except for one weekend visitation
period right in the middle, unless the parties happen to be
going out of state on a vacation and then during the month of
July 15 or July 16 through August 15, then the defendant will
have both children in the home.
When the one weekend of visitation occurs, I am
going to require the defendant to take care of the
transportation and when the next period of visitation comes, I
am going to require the plaintiff to take care of the
transportation both ways.

I am going to come back to my

reasons.
MR. STRATFORD:
THE COURT:

That's after the child reaches one?

That's right.

Until that period of

time, I am going to just require the defendant to make that
trip because he needs the.visitation with the child so I am
going to require that he be the one that take it and, of
course, these are based on the fact that I think that Heather
will be best cared for if she is in the home with his
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parents.

I am not so sure that current living arrangements he

has is persuasive to the Court that it's conducive to the
raising of a daughter.

I am not telling him he has to do it,

but- this is joint custody.

It doesn't take a big change to

change it and if I think there's anything of an untowarded
nature that is going to make a change, I will have to make it, j
but I am not going to tell him how to run his life.

j

Now, there's some other questions and I am going to
refer to them now.
fee.

Each party will pay their own attorney

The defendant will be awarded those family portraits.

The quilts that v/ere argued over was a gift to the child and
that property, along with all the clothes that belong to the
child, except for enough for the plaintiff to be able to
clothe Heather while she is there visiting, will be turned
over to the defendant.
All of the clothes and all of the toys except for
some of those on the same basis because those are the property
of the child and not the property of the parents and likewise,
the quilts.

There's some question over what belongs,

apparently, to the child.
Now, each party is awarded the property in their own
possession with being specific, except for what I changed
here.

The defendant is awarded that '78 pickup that he talked

about, VCR and TV.

There are, apparently, more than one quilt

and the one quilt I am talking about is the one quilt that
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was spoken of as a quilt to the—a gift to the child, Heather.
The others belong to the plaintiff.
The plaintiff will keep the two keepsake dolls and
Cabbage Patch dolls for the sake of the child.

They are the

child's, but I am going to let her specifically keep that
property in her possession.
MR. STRATFORD:
THE COURT:

The plaintiff.

MR. STRATFORD:
THE COURT:

The defendant or the plaintiff?
What did I say.

The defendant.

Okay.

MR. STRATFORD:

Then you said her and I couldn't put

them two together.
THE COURT:

The quilt, other than the one that

belongs to the child — the quilts other than the one belonging
to the child, the two keepsake dolls and Cabbage Patch dolls
to the plaintiff.

It's probably better off if I said husband

and wife so we don't get the confusion.
With regard to the debts, each party is going to be
required to pay any debts they may have incurred since the
time of their separation.

The plaintiff is going to be

required to pay any medical bills that may have been incurred
in the birth of the child-because she chose not to use that
medical attention which was available to her without cost
through the military service.
On the other hand, the Court is going to require
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the defendant to pay the debt to the Utah Valley Credit Union
of about $2,400, jewelry of about $400 and the J. C. Penney
bill of $300.
Now, my reasons and these, of course, need to be
stated as to why I have done what I have with the custody.
Parties are really not going to like what I say about it but
we don't lightly change custody as parties know and there's
always the temptation, of course, to immediately file an
appeal and I don't care if parties file an appeal.
explain why I am doing what I am doing.

I just

It's not to be cruel

to each other but to let you know why I did what I did and
it's not always kind in what I have to say.
So, first, I think there has been some criticism of
the defendant because of his military service.

That he quit

the military service when he had a good job and could have
gone on making good money and supporting the family.

The _

Court finds that the defendant gave up what would be a good
job for the benefit of the possibility of having custody of
his child and to be a responsible parent.

That's why he—if

net the primary reason, certainly one of the primary reasons
he left the military service.

There was no chance in the

world he would have been granted that custody if he remained
in the military service with assignments that would certainly
take him to Germany.
There is another consideration just with the
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military that we can't—normally our appellate courts have
said we will talk about custody matters.

We will pretty much

leave the children where they have been unless there's some
major reason for changing them.

If we followed that in this

kind of a case we would never consider the person who is in
the military service for custody because they are always
subject to that kind of a change of duty and that like the
plaintiff—or not like the defendant, husband, was on his six
months of basic training, there was no way that the family
could be together.

^

•-

So, you can say, well, see, the mother was the
primary custodian during that period of time and she was.
Then, of course, they spent six, seven months together while
they were down in Texas and then major problems developed that
caused them to separate and she moved back to Utah which made
for practical purposes visitation impossible or custody
impossible without some court granting custody there. So,
there is a special consideration that must be given to these
military circumstances that would not be there if both parties
were in the State of Utah.
*—

Now, there have been problems between the parties
while they were married. .This report that I have got from
Steven Watson says the parties have argued a good deal and had
problems between them in their marriage and, of course, he has
listened to both parties to get that information and then what
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he could observe-

It would seem to the Court that each party

is an equal contributor in whatever inability to get along in
the marriage has been.

One no more or less than the other.

With regard to the physical altercations they have
had and, apparently, they have had a number of them and it has
been pointed .out that the husband has reacted violently on
times and has shaken or slapped the wife, but not greatly out
of control.

Not the violence that so often we see in

marriages where one doubles up a fist and breaks a jaw or
breaks an eye or breaks an arm or something else.
Now, mind you, I don't condone it. No man, no woman
has the right, married or unmarried, to use physical force on
another person.

The fact of a marriage relationship does not

give one the right to do something that is otherwise illegal.
It's still illegal.

It's still improper, but I am saying that

I recognize that it occurred.
I recognize, too, that these didn't always occur
just because the defendant or husband got angry.
often the agitator and often the instigator.

The wife was

It involved

slapping and kicking and almost always taunting and while,
what we normally—if we take this outside of the home and
something like this happens and a battery takes place or an
assault takes place where somebody punches somebody in the
mouth and we look to the provocation and we say, what's the
provocation.

Why do they do what they do?

If there's great
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1

provocation, we don't excuse them but my goodness, we

2

certainly take it into account when we impose a sentence for

3

it.

4

That's all I say in this case. There's a good deal

5

of provocation and also actual involvement on the part of the

6

wife as it was on the part of the husband.

7

either one because it's improper in a marriage as it is out.

8
9

I am not condoning

With regard to love of the children, I am absolutely
satisfied that both parties love the children.

101 is best for the children.

They want what

Certainly, as the husband took a

11

hardship discharge from the military so that he could

12

hopefully have custody of one or both of these children, I'm

131 sure if the same option were left to the wife she would do the

14 J
15

same thing.
The evidence does show that the wife has been the

16

primary caretaker, but the primary caretaker must be put in to

17

context of this military service that I spoke of and being in

181 the military service, had he not been in the military service,
19

they would have probably ranked in my mind as jointly being

20

caretakers.

21

the other, while I am recognizing that the wife said he was

I am not sure one would be any more prime than

221 basically a lazy bum and wouldn't do things. He would watch

I

23

TV and so on while I worked and I am not saying you said that

24!

today, but I am just repeating it from what Mr. Watson has

25

stated in his report here.
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I think that he had enough concern that he was with
the child and did things with the child and probably hadn't
come to the point that so many of us are today in this world
that ERA is demanding equality.

I don't know if we are ever

going to get it, but it certainly has changed lifestyles,
anyway, as this hearing is evident of.
Now, I think both parties are tied to their parent's
apron strings and there's some positive and some negative
aspects to that. As I listened to both parents tell what
their son or son-in-law or daughter-in-law and in the report
what they did and didn't do, I am not so sure these young
people are making all the decisions they need to make for
themselves.

When there's hard problems between them, they

shouldn't have been asking mom and dad.

They should have been

asking each other.
And sure, they will make mistakes and in doing that-but, you grandparents stop and tell me if you didn't make the
same mistakes, you know, when you were young.

I know you did.

I made a lot of the same mistakes and now that I know my
parents a little better, I know they made some of those same
mistakes.

They were not perfect, but they had a son that was

not perfect either.

I have six children and my children don't

think their dad is perfect and is not.

I have six children

and my six children are not perfect either.
What I am trying to point out is that sometimes,
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hopefully not very often, we learn by experience and we learn
good through experience and there needs to be a point where
both of these parties cut those ties with the parent's apron
strings.

I am not suggesting that be done right now.

I think

while both these parties have got these children to care for
and they are both trying to get through school and both
finding the necessity of working, that is probably a great
support, but they still ought to basically be able to make
some of those basic decisions themselves and parents ought to,
being a little crude, keep your nose out or make them or even
insist they make them.
You know, I recall back when I got married and my
wife's mother wanted to know if she could give her a coat and
I said, "No." And she said, "Why not?"
need it."

I said, "Because you

I was willing that anything that she didn't need

they could give to her, but anything she needed I didn't want
them to give to her because I didn't want to undermine my
right as a husband and, you see, as a father in that home.
I am telling them that these same kind of decisions
have to be made by these two and I recognize there is a
difference today.

Not a counseling session to get them back

together.
Now, another problem.

There have been problems in

the visitation and where one child is in each home, I suppose
you just have to be as reasonable with one as you are with the
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other and I know we are talking about another six, eight
2

months, but that's such a small length of time.

3

talking about 18 years here today.

4

about six or eight months and I think you need to cooperate

5

with each other.

g

and if some special event is important to the other party and

7

they want some visitation and they have got no entitlement to

3

it, you ought to let them take and vice versa.

9

is having a family reunion and you wanted the children and

10

it's his time to have them, boy, I think there ought to be

11

give and take.

12

We are

We.are just not talking

You need to try to think about what is fair

If your family

But, I have been pretty definite in what I ruled out

13

because I know there have been problems in the past and I

14

think that the Gyver family have contributed to that somewhat.

15

I don't think that the defendant and his parents have always

lg

been given the visitation under the court's order that they

17

have a right to.

18

Now, a consideration for this, too, is that at the

19

time while the parties were in Texas together, the Court does

20

not believe Janette primarily cared for the child, Heather.

21

Where there was the claim of severe diaper rash and the Court

22

is inclined to—understanding that people today—I am inclined

23

to believe that and I think in that case, while I donft think

24

the husband is what I call a fully-matured person, that's not

25

a terrible criticism, but I don't think you are a
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fully-matured person.
Basically/ in that Texas situation, he showed a
disposition, both to visit with the children and to—and when
he recognized the problem, to immediately do something about
it and even recognized when there was a problem that something
was done about it.
goes on.

He had no choice as to his thing, his work

That's part of his military and I suppose that may

create a lot of problems, but that's part of his military
life, even if it's for a short period of four years.
I can't exclude Janette, the threats of suicide.

I

don't have to believe that they were serious, but they are
certainly suggestive of psychological problems and I am not
even sure that you haven't put them all behind you.
you have.

I hope

Certainly, the husband has shown nothing of a

psychological nature that would interfere with his ability to
properly care for Heather.
There has been an allegation of the paregoric and I
have listened to it.

I think I tend to believe that you were

using paregoric improperly and without a doctor's prescription
on the children.

I would hope that you never do that.

That

any prescription drug for young children had never ought to be
done and even the suggestion, of course, and you may not have
known about it, is that, of course, Kevin, if you take
paregoric it may, of course, have an effect on Kevin as you
have to ask doctors about when you are nursing a young child
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
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because they can often be transmitted from one to the—from
the mother to the child through the milk.
Certainly there's a consideration that the
plaintiff's home or the wife's home seems to be almost too
crowded for the whole family, but it's not in and of itself a
determining factor.

It's just another one of those things,

when you put it all together, while I find that the
defendant's home has plenty of room, if we talk about the
parent's home in Salem as opposed to the apartment.
Those are my rulings-, my reasons. Any questions
from either one of you?
Defendant's Exhibit 1.

You did submit a list called
You agreed by stipulation that that

would be part of it and I suppose wherever it is, that's the
part that if it is there, that the defendant is going to be
given; is that correct?
MR. STRATFORD:
THE COURT:

That's our agreement, yeah.

Yes.

•MR. STRATFORD:

Anything else?

Anything that has the name of

Janette on it, w e —
MR. NEELEY:

When does it take place, your Honor?

THE COURT:

It takes place immediately but I think

where there is going to be a change, you hadn't ought to talk
about the change until Sunday evening since we are on Friday.
Then, do you want me to spell out when every other weekend
starts or I suppose you can easily calculate it to two weeks
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from today as I can.
MR. NEELEY:
THE COURT:

No.
Direct that Mr. Stratford, that you draw

the papers.
MR. STRATFORD:
THE COURT:

Thank you, your Honor.

Any questions?

Okay.

That's all.

Thank you.
(Whereupon, the proceedings were concluded.)
-0O0-

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

1 ft

REPORTER'S CERTIFICATE
STATE OF UTAH
COUNTY OF DAVIS

)
)
)

ss:

I, Nancy H. Davis, Certified Shorthand Reporter,
State of Utah, do hereby certify that the foregoing
transcript, consisting of 18 pages, were stenographically
reported by me at the time and place hereinbefore set forth;
that the same was thereafter reduced to typewritten form, and
that the foregoing is a true and correct transcription of
those proceedings requested to'be transcribed.

^?/a/^s
,/Y ,AJ
Ngpfcy H. Davis

My Commission Expires:

Vjh/rt
Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

19

JCv'7 - n w

_

In the Second Judicial District Court
in and for the

County of Davis, State of Utah

i^T

C7^&__

JANETTE DEEBEN,
Plaintiff,

ADDITIONAL FINDINGS
OF FACT

vs.
DERICK R. DEEBEN,

Civil No. 40735

Defendant.

This court received this case back from the Court of Appeals
on June 10, 1988. On July 15, 1988, this court noticed it on the
calendar for a hearing on August 9, 1988. On July 22, 1988,
counsel for the defendant, Dale E. Stratford, filed a motion to
amend findings of fact nunc pro tunc.
This motion was
accompanied by amended findings of fact. No one appeared for the
August 9, 1988, hearing but the court was informed that Mr.
Stratford had suffered a heart attack and been operated on and
would be out of the office for at least one month. The court
directed plaintiff's counsel, Robert L. Neeley to submit a
memorandum. The court received this memorandum on September 14,
1988. The court received nothing further from the defendant so
it had the court clerk phone defendant's counsel on October 20,
1988, and ask him to contact plaintiff's counsel and confer with
the court. The plaintiff's counsel recently notified this court
that he has not been contacted by defendant's counsel. The court
is of the belief that it can proceed without anything further
from either counsel and will proceed to make additional findings
of fact.
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The court originally found that both parties were fit and
proper persons to be custodial parents.
The court is not
changing this basic finding.
It is in the best interest of the children that the
plaintiff and defendant be awarded joint custody but that Janette
Deeben be awarded the physical care, custody, and control of
Kevin Roy Deeben, born July 1, 1987, and that Derick R. Deeben be
awarded the physical care, custody, and control of Heather Lyn
Deeben.
The court has this day adopted the amended findings of fact
as its own which were submitted by the defendant on July 22,
1988.
In addition the court is going to make more specific
findings of fact as follows:
(1) The parties married on September 4, 1984, and in early
1986 the defendant entered military service in the Army. He was
in New Jersey for basic training until the first of July. The
parties then moved to Fort Hood, Texas. In January, 1987, the
plaintiff returned to Utah. The parties were not getting along
during this time.
There were altercations.
Each party used
violence on the other party. The defendant hit and the plaintiff
slapped and kicked. Both equally participated in provoking the
fights and in fighting. Neither was just acting in reasonable
self defense. The defendant was still in Fort Hood when this
action was filed. He was forced to take a hardship discharge or
be transferred to Germany. He chose the hardship discharge so
that he could fight for custody of his children.
(2) The plaintiff has been the primary caretaker the
majority of the time until the court's ruling on January 19,
1988.
This was out of necessity, however, because of the
defendant's military assignments during the year 1987.
The
plaintiff was not an ideal caretaker, however. The child was not
always properly fed, diapered, or put to bed at a reasonable hour
by the plaintiff. The defendant on returning at late hours from
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military duty would on occasion have to fill those needs• The
defendant spent as much time as a caretaker of the child as the
plaintiff when he was in the home and not filling military
duties•
(3) The plaintiff used paregoric on the child on occasions
when it was not
medically necessary. This made the child
lethargic and unable to sleep properly and neared the point of
being habit forming.
(4) The plaintiff has been a better custodian of the
children, since returning to Utah and being in the home of her
parents where she had the counsel and assistance of her parents
and sisters.
The court clerk is directed to send copies of these findings
of fact to counsel and to return the file to the Court of
Appeals.
Dated November 2, 1988.
BY THE COURT:

r

/

v
T

'

JUDG|T/

-^

/

/

Certificate of Mailing:
This is to certify that the undersigned mailed a true and
correct copy of the foregoing Ruling to Robert L. Neeley, 2485
Grant Avenue, Suite 200, Ogden, Utah 84401 and Dale E. Stratford,
1218 First Security Bank, Ogden, Utah 84401 on November 3, 1988.

:

J2a

u-ui^/Lc
V"—,' t \u-

Deputy Cl'erk
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hit and kick at me.
Q

Would she stand nose to nose with you and say these -

word s?
A

Yes, she would.

Q

And did she ever threaten to destroy herself on more

that one occasion?
A

Yes.

Q

On numerous occasions?

A

Yes.

Q

Would you tell us what led up to these types of

thin gs?
A

On one occasion I am unsure what the occasion was.

It was before we were married.

I stopped at her apartment.

Q

This is prior to the time you were married?

A

Yes, to see her and her roommate answered—let me

into he.i: room.

She was passed out on the bed.

There were

seve ral beer cans in evidence as well as a bottle of
pare goric.

I picked her up and walked her around the room

trying 1bo get her to wake up.

She finally woke up and she had

been trying to kill herself with paregoric and beer together.
On a following occasion when she had grown up we was
argu ing because she had agreed to go to my family.

We had

gone to her family and she agreed to go to my family and in
tryi ng co get ready we had the argument about what we should
have Heather wear and she argued and she never wants to go

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

30

1

to my parent's at all.

2

picked up the knife, held it against her chest and said she

3

was going to commit suicide.

4

if she kept threatening things like this and not changing my

5

daughter's diaper, not keeping the rashes off,

6

Heather was wanting to go.

Then she

I told her I would divorce her

Letfs get back to the knife incident before we leave

Q

7

that.

Was the point of the knife pressed against her body or

8

clothing?

_

9

A

Yes, it was.

10

Q

She indicated it v/as "just held out in front of her.

11

A

It was not held out in front of her.

12
13
14

It was held

against her chest.
Q

Did it appear she had every intention of doing

something with that knife?

15

A

16

Q

17

A

Yes, it did.
, What did you do in response to that knife?
I slapped the knife out of her hand.

I had my

18

daughter in my left arm.

I then, with my forearm, shoved her

19

back against the wall, laid my daughter on the table that v/as

20

right there by the telephone.

21

Q

What did you do with the knife?

22

A

I left the knife laying in the middle of the floor

23
24
25

and I called the police immediately.
Q

What v/as the purpose in calling the police rather

than the doctor?
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A

To try to get some help to control her.

She was

2

being- very vicious, hitting, kicking and clawing at me and

3

several of these hittings were coming extremely close to my

4

daughter.

5
6

Q

Now, you indicated also that there are various times

that you noticed some difficulty with her care of Heather.

7

A

Yes.

8

Q

Have you noticed any difference between the care of

9

Heather when she was by herself or within the family.

10

relationship with you as opposed to the care of Heather now?

11

A

Yes, I have.

12

Q

What is the difference?

13

A

The difference now it seems is that she is either

141

grown up enough to keep Heather's diapers changed where rashes

15

aren't on her and that Heather is being fed consistently now.

16

THE COURT:

Isn't she potty trained yet?

17

THE WITNESS:

18

THE COURT:

19

THE WITNESS:

Yes.

Heather is potty trained now.

Okay.
While I was in Texas with her on

20

several occasions I would come home as late as midnight, even

21

two in the morning on one incident.

22

the fridge screaming because she had not eaten all night.

23

Janette was in front of the TV.

24

stated that she was a big girl and that she could take care of

25

herself.

Heather was in front of

I asked her why.
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Q

(By Mr. Stratford)

Did you have occasion on more

than one time to form an opinion or see—let's back up.

Did

you have occasion to see any problems, physical problems with
Heather as a result of the care or lack of care by her mother
when you returned from the field?
A

Yes.

Q

Would you tell us what you found and what you saw.

A

On several occasions upon returning from the field,

I would find Heather extremely diaper-rashed.
would be bleeding from the rashes.

Her bottom

At these times we did take

her into the doctor on a couple of occasions and he did
prescribe some medication.

He stated then that the diapers

needed to be consistently changed.
Q

And while you were present in the home, did you have

occasion to change diapers and participate in the care of the
child?
A

Oh, yes.

Several times.

My daughter would, in

fact, tell her mother she did not want her mother to bathe her
and she would ask for me by name.
THE COURT:
noon recess.

I think at this point we will take a

Be back at 1:30

(Whereupon, a luncheon recess was taken.)
THE COURT:

Have your witness come back up and let's

proceed.
MR. STRATFORD:

By way of housekeeping items, if

Digitized by the Howard W. Hunter Law Library, J. Reuben Clark Law School, BYU.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

83

it please the Court, we have introduced Exhibit 1, Defendant's
Exhibit 1, which was a list of wedding gifts received and
during the noon hour we wrote' up a handwritten list which I
think the parties have agreed would satisfy the questions we
are asking and so if we can have some copies made, then we can
supply copies to each counsel and we can substitute this in
lieu of the other list.
MR. NEELEY:

Is that agreeable?

Sure.

DIRECT EXAMINATION (Continued)
BY MR. STRATFORD:
Q

Now, you are Derick Deeben who was on the stand

prior to the noon break.
A

Yes.

Q

Do you recognize the oath you took this morning is

still binding upon you and you still have an obligation now as
you did then.
A

Yes, I do.

Q

Now, then, at the time we concluded this morning,

you were concerned about what change you noticed between the
time that she—that your wife, Janette, has returned to her
family home as opposed to when she was taking care of the
children when she was by herself.

I believe that's where we

left it; was it not?
A

Yes, it was.

Q

Would you tell the Court what differences you have
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noticed or what appears to you to be different than it was at
the time that Janette was by herself or with you and her
ability to tend to the children.
A

Since she has been home with her family I feel that

she has actually put a little more, shall I say, desire into
insuring that the children1s welfare is better.

When she was

in Texas there was no real concern with the children.

She,

having stated that she is old enough and that she can take
care of herself, as far as getting food out of the fridge,
making Heather actually open the fridge and getting her own
food out, macaroni and cheese, to be exact, and in Tupperware
containers.
Q

Now, there has also been some question raised about

your concern about marks appearing on the child's body.
you indicate to the Court—Janette made the statement.

Would
You

heard the statement during her direct examination.
A

Yes.

Q

That she had been referred for purposes of child

abuse as far as the mark was concerned.
A

Yes, I did.

Q

Would you tell the Court what you observed and what,

if anything, that Heather did in connection with those marks.
A

Yes.

When Heather came down to our home we noticed

a bruise on her thigh, approximately a 3 3-degree angle coming
down from the front towards the back on the outside of her
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thigh in the upper two-thirds of her thigh.
Q

So, we are not talking about a small round bruise.

What are we talking about?
A

•'

We are talking about something that was

approximately three-eighths inch wide and approximately an
inch to an inch and a half in length.
black.

The bruise was fairly

It was a couple days old before I saw it for the first

time which was when I picked her up to take her home. We do
have a picture of that on video tape.
Q

And did anything unusual happen when you returned

Heather to the Gyver home after that weekend?
A

Yes, it did.

Heather went in and we entered through

the kitchen or the back door into the kitchen.

Heather

stepped into the living room area.
Q

All right. Who was present at that time?

A

Myself, my little brother, my little sister,

Mrs. Gyver and Janette.
were there or not.

I am not sure if Janette's sisters

I am not sure of that.

Heather walked

into the corner of the living room and picked up, v/hat I would
say would be a black

powder

ramrod.

Walked out and said,

"My grandpa hit me with this,"at which time, Mrs. Gyver turned
around and grabbed the ramrod, put it back in the corner, took
Heather1s arm and said, "Eb, your grandpa couldn't have hit you
with that because he is not here right now."
Then she led her into the kitchen and they started—she
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put a fingerful of frosting into her mouth and then Janette
said, don't eat too much frosting, you will get sick and at
the same time still giving her more frosting.
Q

. •.

Did you try to explore or ask what happened or what

this was all about?
A

Yes, I did.

I asked what had happened' and Janette

stated, well, she fell off of her bike and I said, okay and I
left it at that.

I believe what my daughter said and I was

extremely concerned.

Before we had taken her back, which was

Sunday, that morning I had taken her over to the church house
where our family physician was at the time and I got him out
of the meeting and I asked him if he would take a look at it
so he could see how he felt about it because I didn't want to
jump to any conclusions.
Q

And based upon what he said, what did you do?

A

Based upon what he said, he said--

Q

I don't want to know what he said.

Just tell me

what you did as a result of what he told you.
A

Yes, that is correct.

Q

What did you do?

A

Well, what I done is, I took Heather back and asked

What was your reaction?

them'what had happened.
Q

By them, you mean the people at the Gyver home?

A

Meaning the Gyvers and I was told by Dr. Clark

t h a t - -

•'•:•..
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Q

That's hearsay, what Dr. Clark told ycu.

I want to

know what you did after he examined the child and based upon
his examination, what you then did.
'A

Okay.

I took Heather back to our home and got her

ready and we took her, at that time, back up to the Gyver's
residence where the above mentioned occurred.
Q

You said you turned her in for child abuse.

Was any

report fi led?
A

I did not file a report.

Q

So, you do not know of any report of child abuse

being filed p€sr se on that?
A

No.

I don't know for sure that a child abuse report

was filed
Q

So, if one was filed, it was filed by a physician or

someone other than yourself?
A

That. is correct.
THE COURT:

!

You didn't go to Social Services at all

about it?
THE WITNESS:

We had conta cted Social Services at a

time before and asked them about it, your Honor, and what we
could do.
THE COURT:

All right.

That's all.

All right.

I

just wanted tc know.
Q

(By Mr. Stratford)

the paregoric.

Now, tllen, this question about

You raised some considerable concern about
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that.

Would you tell the Court what causes you concern about

that and why you registered this concern.
A

Yes.

On several occasions when we would pick up

Heather for the weekend, upon trying to put her to bed, she
wouldn't go to sleep.

She would either be completely

lethargic but not v/illing to sleep or she would be almost
hyperactive and she would stay up extremely late at night,
much like—I have seen

people on drug withdrawals.

She then

would say before she would go to bed, I need my medicine.
Q

Has that happened on-more than one occasion?

A

Yes.

Q

Now, then, when you have returned Heather to the

Several occasions.

Gyver home and you had occasion to take the young child,
Kevin, have you noticed anything unusual or out of the
ordinary so far as Kevin is concerned?
A-

Yes.

Up until the report was filed with the

Division of Family Services about the paregoric, after Heather
asked for it by name, Kevin was exceedingly lethargic, being
not like a young child should be at that time of evening and
we would have a rough time waking him up for anything.
When he was awake he would lay there.
We would have toys there for him.
them.

He wouldn't play.

He wouldn't even watch

After the report was made, the next time we picked him

up he was active and like a child his own age.
Q

So, you noticed a substantial difference?
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TESTIMONY (IN PART) OF
CHARLENE DEEBEN

\
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have indicated that you noticed some things that concerned you
about Heather's well-being and about her receiving medication
and/or care in the Gyver home. Would you indicate to the
Court what your concerns were and the reasons therefore.
A

We picked her up on every other weekend and the

last, probably from the mid of September—I'm not sure of the
exact dates.

I have it documented.

Anyway, Heather—we would

get her ready for bed and she would ask for medication. We
discussed it, what medication would Heather be getting and we
would talk to her and we would,say, "Heather, you don't need
medication."
Then in October Derick would try to get her to bed and I,
of course, with the rest of the family and finally at 3:00 he
came to me and said, "Mom.

She keeps asking for medication

and she said she has a tummy ache."
she is getting the flu?"

He said, "Do you think

Well, when we got up and she didn't

have a fever or anything like that but she kept asking for
this medicine—and I said, "Well, I don't know what
medication, but she has asked for it a lot of times."
Usually Heather is not one that wanted to take medication
and that surprised me that she had been asking for it because
any time, you know, when we got medication from the doctor to
give her when she had strep throat, she didn't want to take it
and we would have to talk to her about it and then she would
take it.
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Anyw ay, it was 3:00 in the morning and so we decided that

1
2

maybe she did need something.

Maybe she. was having a flu and.

3

we had some Pepto-Bismol and baby Tylenol.

4

Tylenol w hen she had the strep throat and I said, "Do you

5

think if she has a tummy ache, with the Pepto-Bismol, we can

6

give her a teaspoon of that."

7

Tylenols and she told me that that wasn't the medicine I take.

8

"This is the wrong medicine, Grandma."

9

Tylenol a t all until I crushed it up and mixed it in some

10

water and put it in a teaspoon, then she did take that.

11

was 4:30 before we got her to bed.

12

the whole day, no nap, no nothing, other than she slept about

13

half hour when we were traveling home from Ephraim.

14

gone down to get wood.

We had gotten the

I tried to give her two baby

She would not take the

7:00 she was up.

She went

We had

Again, when Derick was trying to get her ready for bed

15
16

she started asking for medicine.

17

bed.

She needed medicine to go to

18

Q

Did something unusual happen?

19

A

Later on, yes.

20

have my g randpa.

21

ache.

22

bed at ni ght."

She finally said to me, "I have to

I can't sleep without it.

I need my paregoric.

I have a tummy

I get my paregoric before I go to

23

Q

Those are the words that she used?

24

A

Those are the words she said and I said, "Oh,

25

It

Heather.

They are not giving you paregoric," and she said,
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11

Yes.

I have to have my paregoric.

I can't sleep without it.

I have a tummy ache."
Q

And did you notice anything different in her

behavior?
A

She was agitated.

She wouldn't sleep but yet

sometimes she played really good, but other times she would be
so much more uptight, more nervous.

I was concerned, the fact

that she just wouldn't sleep and we couldn't get her settled
down and now she takes a nap each day we have her and she goes
to bed good at night.

We don't have any problems and she goes

right to sleep.
Q

That's after the question arose as to the paregoric

was settled?
A

Yes.

It has been the last two weekends we noticed.

Q

A change?

A

A change in her.

Q

Did you notice anything unusual about the child,

Kevin?
A

Oh, yes.

Q

Would you tell us what, if anything, you observed

about the child, Kevin.

Let me preface that. As I understand

it, you had the child for 45 minutes when you picked up
Heather and then when you came back Sunday night you had the
child approximately for approximately two hours. What, if
anything, unusual did you notice about the child?
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Well, he would lay in his little chair.

Q

no motion.

He never kicked.

and look at us.
nothing.

He never played..

There was

He would lay

You try to talk to him and there was no

Once in a while we did finally get a smile but never

moved his arms or lets.
If we held him he was immediately asleep.
keep him awake.

We never could

At times he acted like he was hungry.

We

did, on two occasions, give him a bottle of water which he did
take, bu t then he would drop off to sleep.

We couldnft keep

him awak e.

Q

Did you think that was somewhat unusual?

A

Oh, yes.

We were very concerned about it.

In fact,

I spoke to our family physician about it and asked him.
know, I had looked into a paper.

You

I am an R.N. and I looked to

see v/hat a child betv/een three and four months should be doing 1
1

and he wasn't doing any of them.
Of course, v/e had Derickfs friend, who had a child the
same age as Heather and there was a total difference and so I
spoke to the family physician and said that he was not doing
these th ings.

Is there anything we should be concerned about.

Should we have tests or what should be done.
developing right and he didn't know.

He is not

He just said—told us to

let him know kind of what we found each time that we picked
him up f rom there after.
Q .

-

And after this question was determined about the
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1

paregoric being in the house and some of the problems that,

2 I apparently, you were concerned about and after the report was,
3 I in fact, made, did you notice any change about the child?
4

A

Yes.

We picked him up on Friday night.

I didn't

5

notice too much change then, but then when we came back for

Q I

two hours Sunday night he was totally different.

7

crinkle paper off to the side and he would turn his head where

3

before he would never do that.

9

all before.

lo|

could lift himself up in his little seat and he would hand

H

onto my fingers whereas before he was just slumped.

12

nothing there.

13

playing with his hands.

14

child should be doing at that age and he didn't go to sleep

15

until we would bring him home and he would fall asleep in the
i~ai.

17

wilt:ii

Q

wc

We could

There was no eye movement at

He was watching objects as we moved them.

He was laughing.

w t^j_c

^uinxiiy

He was kicking.

He

There was
He was

These are all normal things that a

nume .

Now, you indicated that you have some medical

181

experience by way of background.

19

experience?

20

A

What is your medical

I am a registered nurse and I wo rk for I.H.C. Home

2 ! J Health and I worked there for three years and I worked for the
22)

county for three years previous to that and then I had

23

experience in the hospital and in doctor1s offices.

241

Q

So, how long have you been a reg istered nurse ?

25 I

A

Oh, dear.

I would tell my age.

Since 1959.
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